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President Donald Trump has pledged to roll 
back many of his predecessor’s programs 
and initiatives. One area where he is likely 
to shift tack is the Syrian conflict. He has 
promised to work with the Russians and 
the Syrians to defeat the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The odd man out in 
this equation will likely be the Syrian Kurds, 
a reliable ally against the jihadists but one 
whose usefulness is reaching its limits.
BACKGROUND
The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party 
(PYD) was the first insurgent group to fight 
the jihadists, beginning with Jabhat al-Nusra 
in November 2012. By the summer of 2013, 
the PYD was preventing ISIS’ encroachment 
east of the Euphrates River. At this time, 
the United States took a lukewarm view 
of the PYD, cautioning it not to pursue its 
autonomy plans while admonishing against 
its ties with the Turkish Kurdistan Workers 
Party (PKK), a group that has been fighting 
Turkey’s government since 1984. The PYD is 
the PKK’s Syrian affiliate and all of its leaders 
served in the PKK.
 But after ISIS killed American hostages 
in 2014, fighting the jihadists became an 
imperative and Washington sought allies in 
Iraq and Syria. When ISIS besieged the PYD-
controlled town of Kobani in September 
2014, then-President Obama first ordered 
airstrikes in defense of the Kurds and later 
commissioned an airdrop of supplies. After 
the administration ended a train-and-equip 
program for rebels in October 2015, it turned 
to the PYD to stand up an Arab contingent, 
known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 
that could take the fight to ISIS. By the end 
of 2016, around 500 U.S. special operations 
forces advisors were dispatched to Syria to 
support the SDF with training and weapons, 
advising an estimated 3,000 fighters.
 Despite Obama’s positive view of the 
PYD, support for the party has always been 
shallow in Washington. While the Pentagon 
backs the SDF, the CIA supports Arab factions 
at odds with the Kurds. Today, the PYD- and 
CIA-sponsored groups frequently clash in 
northern Syria. Key members of Congress, 
including Sen. Lindsey Graham, have also 
come out against the PYD—viewing the 
benefits it provides as insufficient to mitigate 
the costs to the U.S.-Turkish relationship. 
A PAWN AMONG QUEENS
The Turks have always been wary of the PYD 
given its links with the PKK. Days after the 
Syrian government ceded control of Kurdish 
regions to the PYD in July 2012, Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed 
that his country would “not allow a terrorist 
group to establish camps in northern Syria 
and threaten Turkey” (bit.ly/2jZqH9u). The 
Turks fear that the PYD will allow the PKK to 
open a new front on the country’s southern 
border. They also allege that the PYD has 
transferred weapons to the PKK, charges 
Washington has been unable to substantiate. 
For these reasons, Ankara launched 
Operation Euphrates Shield on August 24, 
2016. Ostensibly initiated to dislodge ISIS 
from Turkey’s border, the real impetus was 
to prevent the PYD’s continued capture of 
frontier territory. Since August, the Turks 
and Kurds have occasionally clashed. 
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ISIS in check, attrite rebel forces, and hector 
Turkey when needed.
TRUMP: A NEW ERA FOR THE KURDS
Given President Trump’s inclination to 
disengage from the Syrian civil war, he is 
likely to back the Russian-Turkish ceasefire 
and prospective peace talks. To this end, his 
administration will have little incentive to 
back the PYD. Since he inherited Obama’s 
PYD program and did not initiate it, he would 
have little to lose by curtailing it. Indeed, 
Trump has already cancelled an Obama 
initiative to directly arm the PYD.
 The PYD has largely exhausted the 
benefits it can provide its American patrons. 
It has taken large swaths of uninhabited 
territory on the Turkish border and a string 
of small towns from ISIS. In November 2016, 
it began a campaign to take its biggest prize 
yet: Raqqa. But with around 13,000 Arab 
fighters, the SDF does not have the Arab 
manpower necessary to take Syria’s sixth 
largest city. 
 The PYD never appreciated its tenuous 
position in Washington and its lack of 
support across the bureaucracy. Its leaders 
were never willing to countenance severing 
ties with the PKK to placate Turkey because 
they view their party as a PKK appendage. 
A new Syria policy that is not PYD-centric 
is likely to accompany a Trump presidency. 
The PYD will be squeezed by greater 
powers with narrow agendas that do not 
appreciate the Kurds’ increasingly marginal 
contribution to the battle against ISIS.
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 Turkey would have never been able 
to enter northern Syria without Russia’s 
acquiescence. Ankara’s downing of a Russian 
jet in November 2015 severely strained 
relations. Before the incident, Moscow had 
a favorable view of the PYD. Supported 
by the Syrian government, the Kurds had 
consistently denounced the rebels and 
occasionally clashed with them—policies 
Moscow backed. But following the jet crash, 
Russia upped the ante. Russia began to 
vocally support the PYD and in February 2016, 
allowed it to open an office in Moscow. The 
Russians viewed the Kurds as a convenient 
tool to be used against the Turks.
 Today, the two countries have not 
only patched up their differences, but are 
working closely to further mutual goals. The 
Russians have supported Turkish operations 
against ISIS in al-Bab with airstrikes, a 
gesture the U.S. was late to match. Along 
with Iran, Turkey and Russia have achieved 
a ceasefire and have held peace talks. In 
doing so, the Russians and the Turks have 
emerged as the major powerbrokers in Syria, 
brushing aside the Americans, Europeans, 
and the United Nations.
 The big loser in the Russian-Turkish 
rapprochement will be the Kurds. The Turks 
view them as the chief threat emanating 
from Syria. The Russians, focused on ending 
the war and emerging as the paramount 
power in Syria, will deem them expendable. 
And the Syrian government will shed no tears 
if the Kurds suddenly find themselves on the 
defensive. Damascus viewed the PYD with 
alarm as it blossomed into a Western darling. 
The regime only ceded the Kurds territory 
because it believed they were internationally 
isolated; their initial strength was totally 
dependent on Damascus’ largesse. The PYD 
could never have held remote territories 
surrounded by rebels, such as the Afrin 
pocket and the Aleppo neighborhood of 
Sheikh Maqsud, without government help. 
Damascus also provides PYD-controlled 
regions electricity and has provided spare 
parts for oil facilities. Machiavellian politics 
may, however, shield the Kurds in the 
short-term. The Russians will likely want 
to preserve an asset that can pressure both 
the Syrians and Turks to acquiesce to their 
demands. The Syrians rely on the PYD to keep 
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